Highlights from Aliran Monthly
http://www.malaysia.net/aliran/
Islamic State Discourse: Chops and Churns
by Terence Netto
It may well go down in history as the `September 29 Pronouncement.'
This
was the announcement by Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamed
at
the annual delegates conference of Parti Gerakan in Kuala Lumpur that
Malaysia was already a "model Islamic country."
What the Premier said was a shade short of astonishing. Close
observers of
his 20-year premiership are familiar with his penchant for tactical
surprise and unpredictability. But even they were taken aback by this
move,
interpreted as an attempt to pull the rug from under Pas, fervent
proponents of the Islamic state and Umno's fierce rival for the
Muslim vote in Malaysia.
Hitherto, Umno had maintained that Malaysia should not be an Islamic
state
because it would be unsuitable in a multi-racial, multi-religious
country.
Malaysia could have Islamic practices and laws in banking, insurance,
family matters, and inheritance. But these would run parallel with
prevailing secular laws and practices, a sort of one government-two
nearly
parallel systems that was pragmatic in that it would be able to
appease
fervent Muslims while reassuring non-Muslims.
But this type of government stopped short of calling itself an
Islamic
model of governance. For that you have to have the syariah as the
overarching law in the country, like Saudi Arabia and Iran. That was
not
the case with Malaysia. A quasi-Islamic state it may well be. But an
outright Islamic state required the enthronement of syariah as the
supreme
source of law. Reputable jurisprudential and scholarly opinion have
held
that the Federal Constitution was secular in character and that the
provision on Islam as the state religion was confined to state
rituals and
ceremonies.
Predictably, the `September 29 Pronouncement' triggered a flurry of
public
debate. Non-Muslim components of the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN)
coalition
seemed to have no difficulty in accepting that Malaysia was already
an
Islamic state. This despite the fact that they had been niggling
critics of
the opposition Democratic Action Party (DAP) for alleged collusion
with Pas
to advance the cause of a Islamic state. The Malaysian Chinese
Association
(MCA) and Gerakan developed sudden amnesia over their former aversion
to an
Islamic state and acquiesced to Dr Mahathir's version. This apparent
volte
face did not induce any red faces on the part of Umno's allies in BN.
For
them it appeared you could call the Malaysian polity whatever you
wished,
so long as this did not entail a change to the Federal Constitution,
Across the political divide, the reaction was not monolithic. The DAP
contented that it had nothing against Islam but was opposed to
theocracies,
period. To them it did not matter if the Islamic state was of the
Umno
variety or the Pas kind. Both versions would be ultra vires the
Federal
Constitution, the DAP claimed. In the case of Pas, they derided the
Umno
version of an Islamic state and said they would forward a blueprint
of its
version in due course. (Five months later, the Pas' version is still
not
public knowledge). Generally speaking, Parti Keadilan Nasional and
Parti
Rakyat Malaysia felt no compulsion to state their stance. To them it
was
apparently sufficient to confine their pronouncements to bland
statements
of fidelity to the Federal Constitution.
In the immediate aftermath of the `September 29 Pronouncement', the
public,
especially in the Klang Valley, was treated to a series of panel
discussions on the issue. Sizeable crowds turned up to hear
politicians and
opinion-makers air their views and perspectives. Public interest in
the
issue was given added impetus by the events of September 11 in New
York and
Washington. The Islamic state issue had become a cause celebre. These
talk
sessions were not all organised by opposition parties and
nongovernmental
bodies; component parties of the BN, too, scrambled to hold sessions
aimed
at reassuring their supporters that they had not gone theocratic.
These sessions had the effect of educating public opinion. Attendance
at
them reflected public perception that the issue was urgent and of
compelling public interest. Some discussions, like the ones organised
by
Sin Chew Jit Poh on 23 October 2001 and by the Catholic Research
Centre on
6 January 2002 (both held in Petaling Jaya) drew overflow crowds,
eager to
listen and — judging from the questions that followed — avid for
answers.
Though very little enlightenment was to be had on the shape and form
of an
Islamic state, the people who attended were in evident quest of what
illumination they could obtain on aspects of Islamic rules, politics,
history, and the position of women - matters that they were clearly
keen to
know with greater clarity that they previously did.
Not suprisingly, what certain speakers said in the course of the
panel
discussions and in columns and interviews in the print media drew the
censorious attention of sections of civil society who were
uncomfortable
that the religion of Islam is being spoken about by people who
supposedly
do not have the theological credentials to hold forth on it. These
would-be
censors neglect a truth about democratic discourse: No subject is
safe that
shows it cannot bear discussion and publicity.
An ambivalence is discernible in the attitude of these would-be
censors:
they want the religion of Islam to be held with the highest sanctity.
They
would not hesitate to claim that an Islamic state is panacea for the
ills
of society. Therefore you would think that they would welcome the
subject
being inquired about and pored over with the sharpest scrutiny by
those who
would be affected by an Islamic governance.
By their frowning on aspects of the current discourse on Islam, they
are
causing doubt that the pluralistic beliefs essential to democracy are
compatible with an Islamic state.
They seem blithely unaware that commitment to freedom and a humane
society
does not require acceptance of a religious faith or subscription to
any
theological or metaphysical creed. Though a free society is one that
cherishes religious freedom, it also embraces the right to disbelieve
or to
be less than reverential.
______________________
Terbitan : 4 April 2002
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